

TRANSITIONING FROM WAR TO ENDURING PEACE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSITIONING FROM WAR TO ENDURING PEACE

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the nature of operations immediately following the major combat phase of a conflict. The scope is focused on conflicts which result in the removal of an existing regime and establishment of a new government. The paper describes these types of stability operations and addresses the prevailing characteristics, how these operations are conducted, and how they are successfully concluded. It includes an examination of the roles and interrelationships of the military, civil authorities, non-governmental organizations, and international actors. From this study, a synthesis is proposed for how the prevailing characteristics of these types of operations combined with the right key operational elements lead to an enduring peace.

TRANSITIONING FROM WAR TO ENDURING PEACE

War has already revealed its new face for the 21st century with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this new environment, the greatest challenge for the United States is converting military victory into an enduring peace. Success requires a full and coherent application of national, international, and non-governmental efforts. Achieving the military end state through defeat of the adversary's military and removal of the targeted regime only constitutes an interim step toward an enduring peace. The overarching strategic end state can only be achieved by the establishment of a viable, self-sustaining indigenous government. The effort to transition military victory into a strategic victory must provide for the needs of the population throughout and may prove more difficult, time consuming, and resource intensive than the major combat phase. While operations to create stability may be conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as in failed or failing states, this research focuses on the challenges and functional requirements associated with achieving a lasting victory in conjunction with operations that forcibly remove an existing regime and establish a new government. This paper reviews relevant literature and examines the nature of operations immediately following the major combat phase of a conflict. From this study, a synthesis is proposed for how the prevailing characteristics of these types of operations combined with the right key operational elements lead to an enduring peace.

A variety of related, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting terminology is associated with operations immediately following the major combat phase of a war or military intervention. The terms post-conflict operations, stability operations, peace operations, nation building, and counterinsurgency operations are all used, often

interchangeably, in a variety of doctrinal and academic publications as labels for these operations. U.S. doctrine recognizes the criticality of success in the operations that follow the major combat phase. As an example, it now describes a six phase model for joint operations which includes: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority.¹ This framework, depicted in Figure 1, reflects a significant improvement over the previous joint phasing model and specifically acknowledges the challenges in transitioning from major combat operations to successful conflict resolution. It provides an appropriate context for the operations discussed in this paper. Successful transition to an enduring peace is driven by actions in all phases, but it is in the final two phases where this effort enjoys its primary focus. In this paper the term stabilization operations is used to describe the range of efforts encompassed by the various nuanced academic and military terms associated with stability oriented activities in a military campaign. Stabilization operations are those activities conducted in conjunction with major combat operations or military interventions to establish order and enable civil authority.




Figure 1: Notional Operational Phases versus Level of Military Effort²

Strategic Environment

The 21st century strategic environment sets the stage for stabilization operations that are more challenging than ever before. All the analysis suggests an environment that is increasingly complex, interrelated, and characterized by a diverse array of strategic threats. General George W. Casey, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff, describes the current environment as an era of persistent conflict with protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will increasingly use violence as a means of achieving their political and ideological objectives. He identifies six trends that are creating tension in the international community and increasing the probability of conflict. These trends are: globalization; competition for energy; instability as the populations in less-developed countries grow dramatically; climate change and natural disasters; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and failed or failing states that can provide safe havens for terrorist groups.³ The 2007 Army Posture Statement describes the 21st century security environment as an era of uncertainty and unpredictability that has become increasingly dangerous. This environment is characterized by a decline in the military primacy of states and a rise in non-state extremist movements; a deterioration of adherence to international laws and norms; rise of globalization; diffusion of technology; and growing disparities among “haves” and “have nots” in the international order.⁴ Within this shifting strategic setting, the nature of the threats to the United States is also evolving. *The National Defense Strategy* describes the relevant existing and emerging security challenges and categorizes them as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats.⁵ The changing characteristics of the strategic environment in the 21st century all point to increasingly complex issues and demand an appropriate corresponding shift in national security thinking.

War and the need for complementary stabilization operations are most likely to occur where there is a convergence of these dangerous trends. A substandard quality of life, inadequate social and economic opportunities, and the perceived lack of social justice create despair which increases the receptiveness of the population in a trouble state to ideologues' messages. Globalization aggravates the perception of inequities by providing such a population with greater visibility of how others are living. Technology and the free movement of information facilitate an adversaries' command and control and information operations efforts and the ability of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals to move money, material, and people. This complex 21st century strategic environment provides the context for the specific operational conditions under which stabilization operations will be conducted as the United States responds to threats posed by rogue states, failing governments, or ungoverned territories.

Operational Factors

Within this strategic setting, a diverse set of operational circumstances may exist for each specific stabilization effort. Stabilization operations may include among their primary challenges: humanitarian crisis; disorder; insecurity; external intervention; infrastructure and institutional devastation; and governing legitimacy. There are numerous historical cases of stabilization operations and while all are different, they have some commonality. Stabilization operations include a complex set of players and diverse social, political, and economic factors. Each operation is defined by the characteristics and capabilities in these realms.

Fundamental to success is a clear understanding of the desired end state and a full appreciation for the overt and nuanced factors of the environment in which the

stabilization operation is conducted. The conduct of stabilization operations must be driven by the specific conditions of the operational environment and the strategic objectives. Comprehension of the unique set of political, social, military, and economic factors and correct framing of the problem are arguably more complex and more essential in these types of operations than in any other. As Clausewitz stated, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."⁶

The complexity of stabilization operations is increased by the diverse set of players on each side. Relevant players can be grouped into the stabilization forces, the indigenous population, and the opposition forces. Each player will have its own unique attributes, capabilities, and goals. Understanding the objectives, characteristics, and concerns of all players or parties in the conflict is critical to an appreciation of the nature of the operational environment and development of an effective approach. Stabilization forces collectively include those state and non-state players pursuing stability and support for the emerging government. The opposition includes those players opposing stability and/or the emerging government. In the middle is the indigenous population, the focus of the external stabilization forces, the indigenous government, and the opposition forces. Stability may be a common goal for all parties, but more often instability will be seen by the opposition players as a period of opportunity to seize power or some aspects of power.

Stabilization forces include the military and non-military agencies of each participating nation and the potential or emerging host nation governing entities. They

may also include other organized entities within the society, such as religious, business, or political organizations that support peaceful transition. Where possible, a multinational approach to these operations may leverage a greater diversity of expertise and contribute to legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous population and international community. Stabilization efforts may also include external non-governmental, private, and intergovernmental organizations. Success requires the effective integration of these military and non-military capabilities. Each element of the stabilization forces has its own specific reasons for supporting stability; however they are linked by a shared desire for a stable, enduring peace that serves their interests and objectives.

The population is at the heart of the struggle for stabilization. A population includes the common man and may include deposed political and military leaders, professional and social elites, and potentially, ethnic or tribal groupings. Individual members or groups may choose to be part of the opposition, may choose to integrate in the emerging order, or may adopt a wait and see posture before supporting anyone. A population's fundamental interests will often generally follow Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs. In his classic work, Maslow proposed five levels of needs that drive human behavior as reflected in Figure 2. Higher level needs are generally not important to a person until lower level needs are met.⁷ What these look like as a collective for populations is open to debate, but they will often hold the key to individual motivation in stabilization operations. A people's traditions, historical standard of living, and ideological beliefs will shape their perspective on these needs. The demands and expectations of a population who have historically led an impoverished life will be much different from those of a population which has enjoyed relative prosperity. Embedded in

the general population may be individuals or groups with specific ideological, tribal, nationalist, or separatist views which override typical motivations. Such differences will vary widely from situation to situation and stabilization forces must be culturally astute and not mistake their own standards for those of the indigenous population.




Figure 2: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Opposition to stabilization efforts can take many forms. It may include indigenous opposition to the emerging government, criminal and opportunistic factions seeking advantages in disorder, and other state and external non-state opportunists. Each will have their own practical and political objectives and may be part of a relatively homogenous entity or part of a fractured, diverse collection of sometimes competing and sometimes complementing factions. Opportunists often have a preference for the opposition's cause, but in general are exploiting the instability to further unrelated material or political objectives. The value of instability to both the opposition and opportunists provides a convergence of their interests. The opposition may have as its objective a return to the previously deposed government or establishment of a new

government different from the emerging host nation government. Some may want only weak governing authorities that can be influenced, bought, or coerced in support of their own objectives. The most challenging opposition is an organized, active insurgency, but instability may also be advanced through other means such as class warfare, ethnic and tribal conflict, and economic coercion. Any opposition's primary objective is to undermine the legitimacy of the occupying force and the emerging government. They may use enticement, intimidation, terrorism, or military force to gain support or acquiescence from the people. The opposition will most often operate in a decentralized, sometimes uncoordinated fashion that complicates predictive analysis. Understanding the nature of the threats to security is critical to effectively addressing them. As in all forms of conflict, Sun Tzu's edict "know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" is fully applicable.⁸

Opposition forces often enjoy many advantages over stabilization forces. They typically have the initiative and are not bound by legal constraints. When properly organized, they are inherently flexible and unencumbered by a fixed structure and overarching bureaucracy. They can choose to operate relatively cheaply in terms of manpower and material resources. It is much easier for an opposition element to advance instability than it is for the government to ensure stability. Stabilization forces must be nearly perfect to demonstrate effective security and stability while the opposition needs only sporadic success to demonstrate instability and discredit the government's legitimacy.

In stabilization operations, the general population is invariably the strategic center of gravity for both stabilization forces and the opposition. David C. Gompert of the Rand

Corporation advises that unlike in conventional war between sovereigns, prolonged stabilization operations are a contest with adversaries for the trust and allegiance of the population.⁹ Their support, or at a minimum acquiescence, is central to the success of both sides in the struggle. Mao estimated that if as little as 15 to 25 percent of the population support the opposition, the government would have little hope of prevailing.¹⁰ Assuming this to be true, stabilization forces have the daunting task of gaining and maintaining support of the majority of the population while the opposition need only gain the support of a relatively minor portion. In the end, it is the general population's view of the emerging government and their perception of security, opportunity, and governing legitimacy that will determine the outcome of any stabilization effort.

All players operate within a setting framed by the unique political and social traditions of the particular state. However, nations in which the stabilization operations are conducted will tend to share some common characteristics. For example, nations in which the United States or international community feels compelled to intervene or pursue regime change are most likely to be failing states or rogue states. The majority of these are likely to have had authoritarian regimes. Such states are unlikely to share our values or have similar governing traditions. They are most often part of the third world where long standing class and tribal issues have not been resolved. Such characteristics complicate acceptance of ideas such as the rule of law and social advancement as understood in the West. These characteristics shape the population's view of any emerging Western supported government. A nation with traditional aversion to foreign influences; perceptions of historical injustices at the hands of external forces; class and tribal divisions; traditionalist societies; or isolationist attitudes will provide

unique and significant challenges to stabilization forces when Western style governments are advocated and supported.

Stabilization operations are almost universally described as primarily requiring non-military capabilities. As David Galula reflects, revolutionary war is 80% political action and only 20% military.¹¹ This observation applies to the broader set of stabilization operations as well. It is also almost universally accepted that only the U.S. military will have the resources and capacity to conduct the preponderance of the stabilization effort in the early stages of a contested environment.¹² Until security conditions permit, non-military and non-governmental activities are severely restricted.

Stabilization operations are manpower intensive. Controlling territories and populations, establishing security, and restoring services require a substantial physical presence. Many estimates of manpower requirements for stabilization operations have been proposed. In his analysis of counterinsurgency warfare, Galula maintains that “no significant segment of the population can be abandoned for long—unless the population can be trusted to defend itself. This is why a ratio of force of ten or twenty to one between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent is not uncommon when an insurgency develops into guerilla warfare.”¹³ The U.S. Army field manual, *Counterinsurgency*, counters that since the focus in this type of operation is the population and not the insurgent, a more appropriate metric is the ratio of troops to inhabitants. The field manual cautions that each situation is different but supports a general ratio of 20-25 troops per 1000 inhabitants.¹⁴ This is generally consistent with the analysis in a 2003 RAND report on major stabilization operations in the 20th century which, while identifying significant variance across operations, found ratios ranging from .2 to 100

troops per 1000 inhabitants.¹⁵ Specific requirements will vary based on the particular circumstances of each operation, but all generally share a demand for a high ratio of forces to ensure security and provide for the population.

In addition to the characteristics of the key players, the nature of any major combat that precedes a stabilization effort and how it concludes sets the stage for the conduct of stabilization operations. The intensity and duration of the major combat operations affects the psyche of the people and necessarily the design of the stabilization operations. The sudden absence of a governing structure may shock the nation and induce a state of disorder. The more centralized the previous government, the greater the impact will be upon its removal. Under these conditions, moving decisively to address emergency requirements and fill the void in governance is critical to success. Delays provide the opportunity for the opposition groups to organize and leverage the crisis to gain public support. The degree of development and stability in the state prior to the conflict will also dictate the degree to which indigenous capabilities may be available to support an emerging government in the aftermath.

Time is generally on the side of the belligerent with the greatest strategic patience. In a recent Army War College study, Dr. Conrad C. Crane evaluated 28 historical cases of stabilization operations with a counterinsurgency campaign and found that on average they took 11.7 years to conclude. His analysis revealed that the government has an initial window of opportunity to prevail before an insurgency can establish itself. If this window is missed, the probability of success begins to favor the insurgent. His study indicated that the stabilization forces typically had about four years to defeat the opposition before the insurgent tended to gain the advantage. The insurgent's

advantage then existed for a period of about five years before the trend again favored the government.¹⁶ This analysis supports the conclusion that nations must be prepared for the early, and potentially, long term commitment of resources in stabilization operations.

Each stabilization operation is unique to its time and circumstance. However, this uniqueness can be understood in terms of the operational factors shared by all such missions. Effective stabilization operations require a thorough appreciation of the operational characteristics comprised of: the complex set of players in support of and in opposition to stability; the political, social, and economic factors; the requirement for extensive non-military capabilities; the need for substantial manpower; and a tendency toward long duration. With these specific factors in mind, the operational elements that comprise the major areas of focus for the stabilization forces can be determined and addressed.

Key Operational Elements

Once stabilization forces have appropriately identified the operational factors that characterize the environment and accurately framed the nature of the problem, a coherent plan of action can be developed. Stabilization must focus on several interrelated sets of activities – the key operational elements. These elements form the basis of the operational design for stabilization efforts.

Much has been written on organizing constructs for stabilization operations. These include various sets of critical tasks, focus areas, lines of operation, and major mission elements. Such constructs describe the principal things that must be done in support of successful stabilization operations. James Carafano and Dana Dillon, in their writings

for the Heritage Foundation, refer to the “Disease and Unrest Formula” used by World War II planners and maintain that three enabling tasks must be performed before reconstruction can be successful. This formula proposed that stabilization forces must: avert humanitarian crisis; establish a legitimate government; and provide domestic security forces to support the government. Once these tasks have been completed, they maintained, post conflict operations are essentially finished.¹⁷ The Department of State organizes post conflict reconstruction requirements into five essential tasks: security; governance and participation; humanitarian assistance and social well being; economic stabilization and infrastructure; and justice and reconciliation.¹⁸ Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, also organizes around these essential tasks.¹⁹ The U.S. Army field manual, *Counterinsurgency*, describes five potential lines of operation: combat operations/civil security operations; host nation security forces; essential services; governance; and economic development.²⁰ The organizing constructs described above are fairly consistent with one another and reflect the basic idea that successful conflict resolution requires that the needs of the people be met and that conditions must be established to allow for the emergence of an enduring, legitimate government. These requirements can be grouped into four key operational elements: meeting survival needs; providing security; enabling social justice; and establishing effective governance.

The essence of successful stabilization operations is the population’s perception of the government’s ability to provide for their needs in both the short and long terms. These perceptions, on an individual level, are likely to follow Maslow’s hierarchy with lower needs requiring immediate attention. Solutions to higher order needs will have little immediate relevance to the population until the more basic requirements are

satisfied. This leads to a potentially problematic approach of focusing sequentially on survival and security, then on social, infrastructure, and governmental needs. Hostile actions will tend to drive the focus to security requirements and combat operations. While this is a critical early requirement, it can be counterproductive if pursued without appropriate consideration of other needs. Reflecting on experience in Iraq, Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, proposed that focusing too heavily on security without concurrent commitment of appropriate effort to enabling equitable indigenous governance and the rebuilding of infrastructure may undermine the support of the populace and tarnish their view of the emerging government and stabilization forces.²¹ The interrelated nature of these elements requires that while the primacy of effort may shift through the progression of individual needs from basic survival toward prosperity and fulfillment, all requirements must be considered simultaneously and with an eye toward the strategic end state. Actions must continuously reinforce the efficacy, viability, and legitimacy of first the interim occupation government and then the emerging indigenous government. Some requirements may have more immediate urgency, but all complement one another and must be integrated in a comprehensive approach.

In stabilization operations that are part of broader major combat operations, the military is usually the first organized entity on the scene and has the vast majority of the capabilities available to meet immediate humanitarian requirements. The people will have survival as their first priority. Therefore, the first key operational element is the provision for the basic survival needs of the population. The military's actions will begin shaping the population's perception from the beginning of major combat operations.

Emergency food, water, medical care, and shelter are extremely time sensitive requirements. Timely provision of these basic survival needs has a powerful impact on the population. Failure to do so also has powerful, and adverse, impact. Initially, the general population will be primarily influenced by their perception of which set of players can best provide for their basic physiological needs. Success in this endeavor will profoundly impact the general population's initial view of the foreign military presence and their interpretation of military intentions as either liberation or occupation. In addition to the moral obligation to protect life and practical efforts to win support of the population, occupying powers are also bound by specific legal responsibilities under the Geneva Convention of 1949.²² Inadequately addressing these requirements risks adverse perceptions in the local, international, and domestic communities. Therefore, the initial military campaign must include a plan and resources to responsively mitigate the humanitarian crisis that is often produced in war. This requires an understanding that stabilization operations will demand greater sustainment capabilities than combat units typically possess for internal support and to plan for and resource this requirement as an integral part of major combat operations. It also requires the ability to rapidly integrate non-military relief capabilities into evolving military operations. Success in meeting survival needs is achieved when the majority of the population no longer has their basic survival as a primary concern on a day to day basis and they begin to focus on broader security issues.

Once basic survival needs are evident, the people will begin to shift their priorities to safety and security needs. Thus, the second key operational element is the establishment of security. Security includes the protection from crime and disorder;

protection from the opposition and opportunists' coercion; and protection from other threats such as fire and health hazards that adversely impact an acceptable quality of life. While many aspects of security and reconstruction are primarily civilian functions, historical experience demonstrates that the military will have the predominant capability to conduct the initial restoration of emergency services in a contested environment. Therefore, immediate requirements must be met largely by the military until non-military capabilities can be mobilized and safely employed. Security calls for a diverse set of capabilities that will require the stabilization forces on the ground to simultaneously conduct combat operations, law enforcement, border control, and other civil support functions. The line between military operations and law enforcement will be blurred. The stabilization forces' focus must remain on the population as it pursues security functions. The people must feel secure and have the hope of a better life under the new governance without perceived violations of their personal dignity. The populace yearns for a return to normalcy. Their view of normalcy will likely be very different than that of the stabilization forces. Providing for security is particularly manpower intensive when the stabilization operation includes an organized insurgency posing military, paramilitary, terrorist, and criminal threats.

At the national level, security must also be provided against external threats. Once the sovereignty of the target nation has been compromised, stabilization forces have responsibility for the security of the territory against external players. This includes securing the nation's borders and defending the territory against other regional states and actors. Neighboring states may perceive an opportunity to advance their interests in the defeated state. This may include resolving territorial disputes or actively supporting

an opposition faction in pursuit of a government more friendly to their interests. Success in providing security is achieved when the population feels free to pursue normal routines and the indigenous security forces are capable of sustaining a secure environment against internal and external threats to security.

As survival concerns recede and a degree of security becomes evident, the people's expectations will tend to grow. Their demands for a higher quality of life will continue to rise and they will increasingly focus on the pursuit of normalcy, equity, and opportunity in a functioning civil society. The people's expectations, while shaped by their culture and experience, will include a hope for improvement in their lives and some demand for fairness and equitableness in their society. The third key operational element is the enabling of this social justice. This will include: economic opportunity; social and religious freedoms; civil services; and legal protections.

Stabilization efforts must set the conditions that allow for a return to normal labor and economic practices. Previously existing jobs need to be rapidly reestablished and relevant new jobs created. Job opportunities must provide worthwhile employment for the military age youth. Adequate employment opportunities dramatically affect the people's psyche and provide an alternative to participation in criminal activity or compensated support to the opposition. The ability to provide for oneself and family economically combats hopelessness, diminishes the appeal of opposition and ideological causes, and reduces dependency on stabilization forces.

The population will demand and begin to expect basic freedoms and fairness in their lives. Expectations may be dramatically affected by cultural and religious traditions but will increase nonetheless as survival and security concerns recede. The people's

desire for order and fairness in their lives will include some culturally shaped version of basic rights and freedoms to pursue religious and social relationships of their choosing without persecution. Stabilization forces must understand the dynamics of the environment and provide for the reconciliation of newly created or long standing tensions in order to set the conditions for emergence of equitable norms.

The people will also expect a level of basic civil services and opportunities consistent with their cultural and historical norms. This may include educational opportunity; a legal framework for resolving issues; an economic system that allows opportunity for an acceptable quality of life; and basic utilities such as electricity, water, and sewage. The rapid reestablishment of appropriate indigenous capabilities and practices and the responsive application of appropriate specialized external resources are key to progress in this effort. Stabilization forces require a comprehension of these factors and the capabilities, predominately non-military, to meet societal needs.

Success in enabling social justice is achieved when effective business, economic, education, social, religious, and legal opportunities are in place and societal issues are resolved within the framework of accepted equitable practices.

As the objectives in the other operational efforts begin to be achieved, the fourth key operational element, establishment of effective governance, comes into greater play. While the social justice operational element is focused on the individual's perception about quality of life, opportunity, fairness, and self-esteem; the governance operational element is focused on the collective entities that constitute the institutions, mechanisms, and structures that provide for the operation of nation. Legitimate, effective, and self-sustaining governance is the overarching key to successful

stabilization operations. The government must provide for the needs of the population and be accepted by the people in order to be viewed as legitimate.

Governance is a civilian function; however it is the military that is positioned to establish governance immediately following a major combat operation. The occupying force must plan for interim governance to bridge the gap until indigenous capability can evolve. Stabilization forces set the conditions to allow a viable host nation government to emerge. This may require military governance and martial law for an interim period. The goal is to transition from this to interim civilian governance by the stabilization forces and ultimately to an effective, self-determined indigenous government as rapidly as possible. This is a race against opposition forces who strive to undermine the emerging government and provide a more appealing alternative to the general population.

The interim and emerging indigenous government must have legitimacy in the eyes of the population as well as the international community. In order to gain the support and confidence of the population, an effective indigenous governing capability must be accepted as something other than an instrument of the occupying forces. Establishing a viable indigenous government is a time consuming endeavor. A government that is established too rapidly in the aftermath of conquest by a foreign state will almost inevitably have its legitimacy questioned.

The population's demand for a role in the political process will vary widely depending on cultural considerations and their historical political traditions. A nation with pseudo-democratic traditions will have a population that places higher demands on self-determination. A nation with authoritarian political traditions will have a population that

knows and understands little about self-determination. In fact, the concept of democratic governance may be so alien that it is viewed with apprehension, revulsion, or even fear. Religious and cultural views will temper the population's attitude about their appropriate role in governance. These factors shape how the stabilization forces implement an interim government and the characteristics of the future indigenous government.

Leveraging previously existing indigenous laws, systems, and political expertise may contribute to acceptance by the population. In cases where the existing laws and governing traditions are compatible with our values, they should be retained and enforced. Even in a situation where an oppressive government has been removed, retention of select personnel and practices will put an indigenous face on governing affairs, leverage available expertise, and provide a role for former governmental personnel who might otherwise support the opposition. Retention of portions of the previous governing system may reduce popular resistance to something foreign that is imposed by an occupying force.

Governance runs from the local to the national level. If all politics are indeed local, then governance efforts may need to be started there. The population in many developing countries may have little interest in national level governance. It is the local governance, whether formal or informal, that most impacts the population's daily lives and it is the people's connection to stabilization forces and the national level governance. This local governance may be part of an official governing hierarchy or may be tribal or religiously based. Stabilization forces must understand the nature of the environment at the local level and devote appropriate effort and resources at this level. This again requires substantial commitment of manpower to provide adequate coverage

throughout the territory. Absent appropriate presence and focus by stabilization forces, opposition players will seek to fill the void at the local level.

Reconstruction is key to an enduring peace and begins with the initial restoration of emergency services and interim governance by the stabilization force. However, reconstruction will ultimately be led by the emerging indigenous government. Carafano asserts that nations are not rebuilt by other nations – they rebuild themselves once enabling conditions are set.²³ Stabilization forces enable the emerging government to get through the crisis period and into a state of viable self-governance and reconstruction. Success in establishing governance is achieved when a viable, effective, indigenous government is in place that is friendly to U.S. interests, serves the needs of its people, adheres to international norms of good governance, and is accepted as legitimate by the population.

These key operational elements constitute the major mission sets that the stabilization forces must execute. An effective stabilization operation must: meet basic survival needs of the population; provide for security; enable social justice; and establish effective governance. These elements are inextricably interrelated and must be addressed as part of a coherent campaign. They cannot be divided cleanly into military and non-military responsibilities, nor can they be viewed as sequential efforts. Over the course of the operation, primacy shifts from military to non-military capabilities and ultimately to the host nation. As Figure 3 illustrates, the level of effort required for each operational element will shift over time based on progress and be comprised of a changing mix of military and non-military capabilities. The goal is to progress as rapidly

as feasible through this transition. With an understanding of these operational elements, a discussion of how victory is defined follows.




Figure 3: Level of Effort across Key Operational Elements over Time

Conflict Resolution

Victory is achieved when the primary challenges to stability are overcome and secondary challenges no longer prevent effective self-governance or require substantial external military support. Establishment of a self-sustaining political, economic, social, and legal order is an inherent part of achieving successful conflict resolution. The path to victory flows through the military end state to an enduring strategic end state.

The military end state has been achieved when military capabilities no longer have primacy in the operation and civil agencies can provide the basic governance, services, and civil order. However, the military will remain in support as long as indigenous capabilities are inadequate to fully provide for internal and external security. Military primacy transitions to civilian when security is no longer the predominant determining factor in freedom of action and when civilian capacity has been organized and

mobilized. The military end state sets the conditions for achievement of the political end state.

Political objectives have not been achieved and the conflict is not resolved until a legitimate host nation government is in control, basic quality of life requirements are being met, and combative actions are not necessary for security. Jack Covey describes this end state as a viable peace where the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully prevails over the power of obstructionist forces. It is characterized by an environment where: conflict is resolved by a domestic political process; the security sector is reformed and subordinated to political authority; local institutions maintain the rule of law; and the formal economy outperforms the gray/black markets.²⁴

Implications

Stabilization operations are among the most challenging and resource intensive missions a nation pursues. How a nation views this mission set and postures its national capabilities is central to the probabilities of success. This analysis of operational factors and key operational elements in stabilization operations identifies several implications including: roles and responsibilities of military and non-military agencies; specialized capabilities and expertise; and the feasibility of stabilization operations under certain conditions.

A successful transition to an enduring peace requires substantial non-military organizations, doctrine, and authorities for security, governance, and reconstruction. Much of the current thought on these types of operations acknowledges that the required mission sets are primarily civilian responsibilities, but only the military has the capacity to conduct these operations in many circumstances. The military by default has

primacy at the end of major combat operations, but lacks many of the specialized capabilities required for success. Defaulting to the military because no one else can do the mission is a haphazard approach. Therefore, if a nation's interests demand the capacity to execute these types of operations, it must develop the appropriate expeditionary capability in the military and the rest of the interagency and encourage like capabilities in non-governmental organizations. As one step in this direction, National Security Presidential Directive - 44 assigns the Department of State as the lead for U.S. government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.²⁵ In addition, *The National Security Strategy* establishes the stabilization and reconstruction mission as a priority for the interagency and reinforces the State Department's role as the lead for the U.S. Government. It further emphasizes the priority on development of non-military capabilities to support reconstruction and stabilization efforts.²⁶ This is not a mission set against which U.S. government capabilities are adequately structured and trained and while progress has been made in the last few years, the U.S. interagency capacity for major stabilization operations must continue to evolve.

Stabilization requires flexible forces that can integrate various non-standard military and non-military capabilities. Stabilization efforts must be planned for from the beginning, integrated in major combat operations, and flexibly adjusted to integrate evolving interagency and multinational capabilities as the operation unfolds. Military forces must have embedded interagency staff, advisory, planning, and execution capabilities to immediately begin addressing security, essential services, and governance shortfalls while major combat operations are ongoing. This must include

integration down to tactical level units. Organizational design, doctrine, and authorities must accommodate this requirement. Globalization, population centrality, and effective opposition use of the information domain require enhanced capabilities for information operations. The focus on the population and the desired strategic end state must drive all military actions. Properly framing the problem is arguably more important in stabilization operations than in any other type of military operation. All situations will be different and key factors will change over time. This requires flexible, adaptive leaders who are able to properly comprehend the situation upfront and continuously assess and modify the operational design as the operation evolves. Situational understanding and cultural astuteness are imperative down to the lowest levels. Leader development, training, and education must adequately address these competencies.

In some situations, the conditions in the environment may be such that the degree of devastation and domination required to gain and maintain control of the population is incompatible with our values. The culture, traditions, and historical perceptions of the indigenous population may make any externally imposed solution untenable. In these cases, it may be necessary for the conflict to spiral into further instability and civil war before an enduring, indigenously acceptable resolution is achieved. When this occurs, stabilization forces largely lose their vote in the outcome. Decision makers must understand the circumstances under which an optimal outcome may not be possible and the best strategy may be to not get involved.

Conclusion

Successfully transitioning from war to peace is an extremely complex, resource intensive, and long duration endeavor. A nation which contemplates commitment of

national power for the forceful overthrow of another government must commit to the development and maintenance of sufficient capabilities to ensure the successful transition to an enduring peace. This requires expeditionary military and non-military capabilities to meet immediate survival needs, establish security, set conditions for social justice, and ensure transition to legitimate, indigenous self-governance.

Endnotes

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